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5The assessment of the effectiveness of anticorruption policies and 
tendencies in the spread of corruption is a key element of the Strategy 
for Transparent Governance and Counteraction of Corruption adopted by 
the Bulgarian Government for the period 2006-2008. The Government’s 
2006 Program for the implementation of this Strategy envisions the 
development of a system of indicators to monitor progress and actual 
impact. The System of Indicators has been developed based on the best 
European and world practices and primarily draws on the experience 
gained in Bulgaria in the period between 1997 and 2006 from the 
implementation of the Corruption Monitoring System developed by the 
Center for the Study of Democracy within the Coalition 2000  anticorruption 
initiative.  It includes several basic components:
1. Goals and basic guidelines;
2. Methods of assessment and analysis;
3. System of indicators.
The main objective of the system of indicators is to introduce a viable 
mechanism of accountability and evaluation of the results of the 
implementation of the Strategy and the Program in the area of prevention 
and counteraction of corruption and of transparent governance and thus 
enable the Bulgarian Government to communicate its achievements to 
the public and its international partners.
More specifically, the objectives of the system of indicators are:
1. To monitor the implementation of the specific measures envisioned 
in the Program for the Implementation of the Strategy for Transparent 
Governance and Prevention and Counteraction of Corruption for the 
period 2006-2008.
2. To track progress in achieving the specific goals outlined in the 
Strategy and related to ensuring transparent governance, prevention 
and counteraction of corruption.
3. To monitor and evaluate the impact of the Strategy and the Program for 
its implementation and the effectiveness of the measures for prevention 
and counteraction of corruption and transparent governance.
4. To assess the overall sustainability of the Strategy and the relevance of 
the measures outlined in the Implementation Program to the goals of 
the Strategy based on information collected until the end of 2008.
The elaboration of the system of indicators is based on several 
principles:
• The use of methods and indicators that have already been nationally 
and internationally tested and proven effective;
I. GOALS AND BASIC 
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• The use of indicators which take into account the key problems 
identified in the Strategy; this refers to the issues of highest concern 
and to the content of the envisioned anticorruption policies and 
measures;
• The use of multiple sources of information and methods to 
verify the data collected in order to ensure accuracy and 
credibility;
• To allow for regular monitoring of the spread of corruption in 
various spheres, levels, institutions, and professional groups while 
assessing the impact of the anticorruption policies and measures 
carried out under the Strategy and its Implementation Program;
• To balance the comparability of indicators over time with flexibility 
to account for the specific issues during the various stages of 
implementation of the Strategy and the Program;
• The indicators to allow for analysis of the results of the adopted 
measures, as well as to help identify priority areas and problems 
for prevention and counteraction of corruption;
• To ensure comparability of the information for Bulgaria with 
information about other European countries;
• The indicators would familiarize the Bulgarian public and international 
partners with the results achieved and would encourage the public 
debate and civic initiatives for the prevention and counteraction of 
corruption.
• The indicators to allow for the development of a database of 
monitoring and assessment results. The database would be made 
available to institutions and individuals in order to help them 
improve anticorruption strategies and programs.
A major challenge in the development of the system of indicators is the 
need to use objective criteria, methods and tools for assessing the 
spread of corruption. The accurate and objective assessment of the 
scope and spread of corruption and organized crime in Bulgaria, which 
is comparable to information about other EU member countries, is a 
necessary precondition for avoiding misguided decisions which could 
have serious negative implications – decreasing trust in the democratic 
institutions, increasing sense of ambiguity about EU demands and 
expectations, unjustified political speculations about the magnitude of 
corruption, etc.
Bulgarian and international experience in the past 15 years has shown 
that methods ensuring reliable information about the level and dynamics 
of corruption already exist: national surveys and monitoring of corruption, 
as well as international comparative studies of corruption. Most types 
of research have been conducted in Bulgaria which makes it possible 
to produce objective and reliable comparative analyses. The national 
Corruption Monitoring System (CMS) is now in its eighth year of 
implementation. Through the CMS, the spread of corruption has for the 
first time been measured not only based on public perceptions, but also 
by collecting information about acts of corruption (experience) and cases 
of exerted corruption pressure. The International Crime Victimization 
II. METHODS OF 
ASSESSMENT AND 
ANALYSIS 
Surveys (ICVS)1 have been conducted since the late 1980s and have 
made it possible to evaluate these phenomena based on their actual 
observations rather than on subjective opinion. Since 2002 the ICVS has 
been conducted three times in Bulgaria by the Center for the Study of 
Democracy and Vitosha Research within the framework of the National 
Crime Survey (NCS).
In line with the formulated goals and guidelines, and drawing on 
Bulgarian and international experience, the Corruption Monitoring System 
is suggested as a baseline instrument for the elaboration of the indicators 
for several reasons:
• The CMS has proven effective and accurate. It has also been 
recognized by the United Nations as a best practice national 
system for corruption research.
• A significant part of the indicators have already been developed 
and can be successfully applied for the purposes of evaluating 
the implementation of the Strategy and the Program in the field 
of prevention and counteraction of corruption and transparent 
governance;
• The availability of a database from past surveys allows for 
comparisons and analyses of the progress made.
The proposed system of monitoring indicators employs a set of methods 
to summarize data, experience, opinions, and assessments of several 
target groups:
1. Representatives of non-governmental organizations;
2. The adult population of Bulgaria, including users of administrative, 
social and other public services;
3. Representatives of the business community and employer 
organizations;
4. Key experts with government institutions.
The opinions of these groups are to be supplemented by:
• Official statistical information;
• Information provided by various government institutions and 
agencies involved in the implementation of the Strategy and the 
Program;
• Court and police statistics;
• National and international comparative surveys on corruption and 
transparency of governance.
The above listed sources of information can be accessed using the 
following methods:
1. Expert opinions, assessments and analyses by experts and representatives 
of non-governmental organizations about the spread of corruption in 
various sectors and the effectiveness of anticorruption policies and the 
adopted legislation and regulations;
2. Self-assessments by the institutions and agencies involved in the 
implementation of the Strategy and Program;
3. Analysis of data from official statistical surveys, the information 
systems of various government agencies (Council of  Ministers and 
1 International Crime Victimization Survey (ICVS) или EU International Crime Survey (ICS).
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key ministries, Commission for the Prevention and Counteraction of 
Corruption, National Audit Office, court and police statistics, etc.), 
national and international surveys;
4. National representative surveys of the population and the business 
community on corruption practices;
5. Service Delivery Surveys of the users of administrative, social, health 
and education services.
6. Mystery Customer Surveys for public services (including staff integrity 
checks);
7. Monthly monitoring of publications in the press, radio and 
television.
Appendix 1 contains a brief outline of the basic methodological parameters 
of the proposed research methods.
The indicators, evaluating the results of the anti-corruption and 
transparency measures of the government differ by type and by method 
of data collection and analysis. Three groups of indicators could be 
delineated: 
The first group reflects the measures included in the Strategy and 
the Program evaluating their adequacy, effectiveness, implementation 
progress, observance of deadlines, etc. 
The second group of indicators aims to evaluate the social environment 
factors directly affecting the level of corruption and governance 
transparency.
The third group shows the effect of implemented programs and measures 
on society by monitoring their outcomes and practical impact. This, 
therefore, is also an assessment of the effectiveness of anticorruption 
policies. 
In line with the goals, guidelines and methodology for assessing the 
impact of the Strategy and the Program the following system of indicators 
is proposed:
А. Indicators for assessment of the implementation progress of the 
specific measures outlined in the Program for the Implementation 
of the Strategy for Transparent Governance and for Prevention and 
Counteraction of Corruption for the Period 2006-2008. 
These indicators reflect the effectiveness and the implementation 
progress of the measures within the specified timeframe. Information 
is collected through expert opinions, assessments and analyses; self-
assessment by the institutions and agencies involved in Strategy and 
Program implementation; analysis of data from official statistical surveys; 
agency information systems; national and international surveys conducted. 
They include the following sets of indicators:
IІІ. THE SYSTEM OF 
INDICATORS
1. Availability of laws, programs, analyses, research methodologies, 
proposals, plans, publicly announced measures, etc;
2. Relevance of the measure adopted (e.g. is it consistent with the goals 
it is supposed to help achieve);
3. Timeframe compliance or non-compliance - has the particular measure 
been applied keeping the time schedule envisioned in the Strategy 
and the Program;
4. Implementation progress - has the particular measure been carried out 
to its full scope and content;
5. Quality of the elaborated laws, programs, analyses, research 
methodologies, proposals, plans (has the measure been applied in 
line with good practices and established standards);
6. Quantitative indicators measuring the outcomes of the adopted measure 
(number or relative share), e.g., number of anticorruption trainings 
conducted; number of trained administrative officials at all levels; 
number of hotlines established; number of corruption-related 
complaints filed, etc.;
7. Effectiveness of the measure adopted (assessing the cost-effectiveness 
of the particular measure).
Appendix 2 outlines the specific measures from the Strategy Implementation 
Program and the proposed assessment indicators.
B. Quantitative surveys of the general population and the business sector 
will be used to measure the progress towards the goals set forth in 
the Strategy using the following indicators:
1. Corruption Victimization
a) Proportion of people who in the past year/three months have had 
to provide money, gifts or favors to a public sector employee.
b) Total value of informal payments/gifts made to public sector 
employees in the past three months;
c) Total value of informal payments/gifts by type of service;
d) Proportion of companies that have made informal payments in 
order to obtain licenses or authorizations;
e) Proportion of companies that have made informal payments in 
order to win public procurement contracts;
f) Proportion of companies that have made informal payments in 
order to evade/reduce taxes, customs duties, fines, fees, and other 
due payments to the state;
g) Total and average amounts of the informal payments made by 
companies in relation to applications for  licenses or authorizations, 
participation in public procurement tenders, payment of taxes, 
duties, etc.
2. Corruption Pressure
a) Share of individuals who in the past year have interacted with 
officials that have requested favors, money, or gifts in order to 
solve a particular problem;
b) Relative share of citizens/companies that have been asked for 
money, gifts or favors in their contacts with public sector officials 
during the past year;
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c) Relative share of citizens/companies to whom it was indicated, in 
their contacts with public sector employees during the past year, 
that money, gifts, or favors were expected;
d) Ways in which citizens and businesses exert corruption pressure on 
the officials;
e) Ways in which the officials exert corruption pressure on citizens 
and businesses;
f) Main reasons why citizens and businesses typically initiate corrupt 
practices.
3. Attitudes towards Corruption
a) Awareness of corruption as a problem and its perceived importance 
relative to the perceived importance of other social problems;
b) Relative share of those to whom it is acceptable to give money, 
gifts, or favors in order to have a problem solved;
c) Relative share of those to whom it is acceptable for MPs, ministers 
and state officials to take money, gifts, or favors;
d) Relative share of those to whom it is acceptable for administrative 
officers interacting directly with the public to take money, gifts, or 
favors;
e) Relative share of those to whom it is acceptable for other public 
sector employees (doctors, school and university teachers, police 
officers, etc.) to take money, gifts, or favors.
4. Spread of Corruption
a) Share of those who think corruption is widespread in various 
occupational groups;
b) Spread of corruption in institutions and spheres of public life in 
Bulgaria;
c) Spread of corruption in ministries and government agencies; 
d) Spread of corruption in the judiciary; 
e) Spread of corruption in the education system;
f) Spread of corruption in the healthcare system;  
g) Assessment of the potential corruption risk in cases of interaction 
with various government and public institutions;
h) Assessment of the potential corruption risk in the delivery of public 
services.
5. Intolerance of Corruption
a) Share of citizens/companies that have filed complaints concerning 
corrupt practices; 
b) Readiness of citizens/companies to report cases of corruption to 
authorities;
c) Main reasons for reporting/failing to report cases of corruption.
6. Corruption Factors
a) Assessment of the major factors affecting the spread of corruption 
in this country; 
b) General impact of corruption on the social process;
c) Effect of corruption on private business development.
7. Government Action
a) Assessment of government efforts to counter corruption; 
b) Assessment of the anti-corruption measures adopted (effectiveness, 
timeliness, transparency, accountability, etc.) in general and in 
specific sectors;
c) Assessment of planned or implemented measures for the prevention 
and counteraction of corruption;
d) Institutions perceived as most effective in counteracting 
corruption;
e) Assessment of government capacity to curb corruption in 
Bulgaria; 
f) Level of trust in institutions based on perceived levels of 
corruption.
8. Awareness of Anticorruption
a) Awareness of anticorruption measures adopted; 
b) Interest in anticorruption measures adopted; 
c) Information access – sources of information and accessibility of 
information about the measures adopted;
d) Awareness of the public and the business community of the 
legal framework related to administrative services and corrupt 
practices;
e) Awareness of citizens/businesses of their rights and obligations in 
their interaction with officials at all levels.
В. The third group of indicators refers to monitoring and assessing 
the impact of the Strategy and the Program on the spread of 
corruption in Bulgaria and the effectiveness of the measures for 
prevention and counteraction of corruption.
The values of these indicators can be measured through service delivery 
surveys and “mystery customer” surveys for different services (including 
staff loyalty tests). The following indicators will be assessed:
1. Number of documents required for delivery of an administrative service:
a) Total number of documents formally required by law or under 
other regulations (decrees, ordinances, etc.);
b) Number of additional documents required only by the officials 
from the respective office;
c) Number of documents required at the discretion of the respective 
official when filing the full set of documents without being stipulated 
elsewhere;
d) Costs incurred for providing documents not officially requested.
2. Time spent on filing documents:
a) Number of visits to the respective administrative office until final 
document delivery;
b) Total number of hours spent on filling in forms, obtaining the 
required documents, and waiting time at the respective office.
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3. Availability of instructions for submitting the documents needed to initiate 
the administrative procedure:
a) Availability of a list of the required documents visibly displayed in 
a generally accessible location;
b) Availability of explanations and a description of the entire procedure 
for delivery of the respective service visibly displayed in a generally 
accessible location;
c) Need for further clarifications from an official from the respective 
administrative office.
4. Total duration of the procedure from the filling of the documents to final 
completion:
a) Delays/observance of the deadlines specified by the administrative 
officials;
b) Communication from the administration in case of improperly 
completed forms;
c) Requested extra fees (other than the officially stipulated ones);
d) Setting additional conditions (other than the officially stipulated 
ones) for speeding the procedure for the delivery of the respective 
service.
5. Staff quality and competence
a) Availability of sufficient personnel at the respective institution;
b) Assessment of the problem-solving capacity of the staff;
c) Assessment of the professional competence/incompetence of the 
staff;
d) Observance of working hours by the staff;
e) Prompt performance of the tasks and duties of the respective 
office.
6. Service quality
a) Overall assessment of the quality of delivered services 
b) Effectiveness assessment (measuring the costs against the results is 
a way of assessing the effectiveness of the particular institution, 
while measuring costs against final outcomes provide a general 
assessment of the overall social effect of the service);
c) Suggested improvements to the service or some of its aspects/
stages.
1. Expert Opinions
In-depth interviews will be conducted with experts (representatives of 
non-governmental organizations and civic associations). They will be 
asked to provide opinions, assessments and analyses concerning the 
spread of corruption in various sectors and the effectiveness, relevance, 
and timeliness of the anticorruption policies and adopted laws and 
regulations.
Interviews will be conducted on both the central and regional (local) 
levels, in Sofia, as well as in regional centers and smaller communities. A 
total of 30 interviews with experts will be conducted. The collection of 
expert assessments will be part of the implementation of the first stage 
of the monitoring that is to begin at least six months after the start of 
the implementation of the Program.
2. Self-Assessment by Institutions
Part of the information concerning the implementation progress of 
the Strategy and the Program is to be collected from the institutions 
that are expected to perform the planned anticorruption tasks and 
activities. The self-assessment will be carried out by an official from 
the respective institution who is familiar with and engaged in the 
implementation of the Program.
Regular reports produced by all government institutions for the CPCC 
can be used for the purposes of the survey. In addition, a methodology 
will be designed to collect the information necessary for assessing the 
implementation of the measures.
3. Desk Research
Desk research will involve analysis of secondary data from existing 
sources of information (EU reports and recommendations; reports from 
the institutions; the entire available information from central and local 
government concerning corruption-related reports, cases, actions; national 
and international surveys conducted, etc.). The specific objectives of the 
desk research will be:
• To collect information necessary to assess the execution of the 
2006 Program for the Implementation of the Strategy for Transparent 
Governance and for Prevention and Counteraction of Corruption;
• To explore the impact of implemented anticorruption policies, 
mechanisms, reforms, and activities;
 13
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• To analyze the collected information and draft recommendations 
for optimizing the performance of the relevant state institutions 
and organizations.
For the purposes of the monitoring, secondary analysis will be carried 
out based on information collected from the following institutions:
• Council of Ministers and all line ministries and government 
agencies;
• CPCC;
• National Audit Office;
• Judiciary and Ministry of Interior;
• National Statistical Institute;
• European Commission, and others.
1. National Representative Surveys of the Population and the Business 
Sector
1.1. National Representative Survey of the Population of Bulgaria Aged 18 and 
Over
Sample size: The proposed total number of interviews planned for each 
national representative survey is N=1,000.
Sampling model: random two-stage cluster sample based on random route 
walk. 
Survey method: Face-to-face interview at respondent’s home. The surveys 
of the adult Bulgarian population may be conducted independently and/
or including questions in omnibus surveys.
1.2. National Representative Survey of the Business Sector
Sample size: The total number of planned interviews for each national 
representative survey of the business sector will be N=500.
Sampling model: random two-stage cluster sample.
Survey method: Face-to-face interview at respondent’s office.
2. Service Delivery Surveys
The Service Delivery Surveys (SDS) aim to evaluate the delivery of services 
to the public and the business sector by state, district, and municipal 
departments and agencies. The assessment is carried out through analysis 
and monitoring of the main stages in service delivery by a particular 
institution. The rationale for conducting SDS is essentially the following:
• SDS results would help establish and analyze the strengths and 
weaknesses of the administrative and public service system thus 
identifying the likely areas and conditions for the emergence of 
corruption risk at the institutional level;
QUANTITATIVE SURVEYS
• SDS provide an objective system for measuring the corruption risk 
at the administrative level;
• SDS provide information about the results from the implementation 
of the Strategy and about the practical effectiveness of the 
envisioned measures.
• The practical implementation of SDS involves the following 
stages:
– Developing a system of indicators for the assessment of public 
service delivery;
– Collecting information through a series of surveys on the services 
provided by ministries, regional departments of the National 
Revenue Agency, health and medical establishments, structures 
within the education system, customs officials, etc.
– Analysis and comparative assessment of the indicator values 
relative to the measures envisioned in the Strategy and their 
estimated future impact in terms of reducing the corruption risk 
in the respective areas.
Scope of the survey: Depending on the share of the users of the particular 
administrative, social, health, and education services, the SDS will cover 
between 500 and 1,000 persons.
Sampling model: two-stage random route cluster sample is to be used for 
mass services. Quota sampling may also be used in some cases. 
Survey method: face-to-face interview.
3. “Mystery Customer” of Surveys (including staff loyalty tests)
The main goal of this method is to supply information about the actual 
manner in which particular state institutions (on central and local level) 
provide services to citizens and businesses. More specifically, the method 
aims to obtain on-site information about the quality of the services provided, 
how citizens and businesses are treated by the staff, the compliance with 
procedures, deadlines and requirements, and whether mechanisms for 
corrupt practices in the particular field exist.  This type of surveys focus 
on the spheres and services for which there is official information about 
existing corrupt practices and which are exposed to highest corruption risk. 
It will cover institutions at both central and local level.
Overall the plan could include the following numbers and groups of 
mystery users:
– Servicing citizens on central level – 30 mystery users;
– Servicing citizens on local level – 30 mystery users;
– Servicing businesses on central level – 30 mystery users;
– Servicing businesses on local level – 30 mystery users.
The mystery users will be provided with a questionnaire containing a 
set of criteria that have to be monitored, evaluated and described in 
the course of the survey. For specific cases and activities not covered 
by the system of indicators, the mystery users will provide their notes 
in free-form reports.
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4. Media Monitoring
The media monitoring follows corruption-related publications in print 
and electronic media. On a daily basis, a team of web editors collects 
postings on corruption and governance issues into an electronic database. 
Regarding radio and television, the monitoring covers the major newscasts 
and most important news-and-commentary programs. Analytical reports 
will be prepared on a monthly basis.
The main objectives of media monitoring are:
• To register the quantitative characteristics of corruption-related 
coverage in the national press (national dailies, weeklies and 
magazines), the electronic media with original news programming, 
and national radio and television broadcasters;
• To establish the intensity of corruption-related media coverage and 
estimate its impact on shaping public opinion and attitudes;
• To measure media coverage of anticorruption initiatives in the 
country.
I. Measures in the Public Sphere
1. Prevention and Counteraction of Corruption in the High Ranks of Power
№ Measure Institution 
responsible
Deadline Indicators
1.1. Applying the mechanism envisioned in the 
Code of Ethics of Holders of High Government 
Office and ensuring public access to the 
declaration for the prevention and avoidance of 
conflicts of interests
Council of Ministers 
(CM), CPCC
06/30/2006 2, 3, 6 (number 
of persons who 
have submitted 
declarations), 7
1.2. Expanding public and media access to the 
Registry under the Law on Property Declaration 
by Persons in High Public Office
CPCC, National 
Audit Office (NAO)
03/31/2006 2, 3, 6 (share 
of audience 
reached), 7
1.3. Analysis of the effectiveness of the sanctions 
under the Law on Property Declaration by 
Persons in High Public Office
Ministry of Finance 
(MF), NAO
10/31/2006 1, 4, 5, 7
1.4. Elaborating a draft law on lobbying CPCC, The 
Parliamentary 
Anticorruption 
Committee 
jointly with the 
Ombudsman of the 
Republic of Bulgaria
12/20/2006 4
1. Availability of laws, programs, analyses, research methodologies, 
proposals, plans, publicly announced measures, etc;
2. Relevance of the measure adopted – is it consistent with the goals it 
is supposed to help achieve; 
3. Timeframe compliance or non-compliance – has the particular 
measure been applied in keeping with the time schedule envisioned 
in the strategy implementation program; 
4. Implementation progress – has the particular measure been carried 
out to its full scope and content; 
5. Quality of the elaborated laws, programs, analyses, research 
methodologies, proposals, plans – has the measure been applied in 
line with good practices and the standards set;  
6. Quantitative indicators measuring the outcomes of the adopted 
measure (number or relative share), e.g., number of anticorruption 
trainings conducted; number of trained administrative officers at all 
levels of the administration; number of hotlines established; number 
of corruption-related complaints filed, etc.;
7. Effectiveness of the measure adopted – assessing the cost-effectiveness 
of the particular measure.
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№ Measure Institution 
responsible
Deadline Indicators
1.5. Development and implementation of a training 
program on the issues of corruption, conflicts 
of interests, and professional ethics for all 
ministers, deputy ministers, political cabinet 
members, district governors, deputy district 
governors, chairs and directors of agencies, 
commission members, municipality mayors
CM, CPCC 03/31/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 
6 (number 
of programs 
developed; 
number 
of officials 
trained), 7
2. Transparent Party Financing
№ Measure Institution 
responsible
Deadline Indicators
2.1. Review and analysis of the best 
international practices in the adoption of 
standards of transparency in political party 
financing
CM, CPCC 06/30/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7
2.2. Developing a draft amendment to the 
Law on Political Parties with a view to 
guaranteeing transparency in political party 
financing, including public disclosure of 
their sources of financing
CM, CPCC 12/20/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7
2.3. Analysis of the use of government subsidies 
by the political parties
MF 12/20/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7
3. Measures in Central and Local Administration
№ Measure Institution 
responsible
Deadline Indicators
3.1. Developing a plan for conducting 
anticorruption training for officials at all 
levels of the administration
Institute of Public 
Administration and 
European Integration 
(IPAEI), managers 
of all administrative 
structures
03/31/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 
(number of plans 
developed), 7
3.2. Establishing, reinforcing, and expanding 
the powers of the Inspectorates
All administrative 
structures
03/31/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7
3.3. Designing a methodology for the control 
activity of the Inspectorates
CM 10/31/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7
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№ Measure Institution 
responsible
Deadline Indicators
3.4. Expanding the channels for receiving 
information and reports of corruption 
in all administrations with control and 
regulatory functions (establishing 24-hour, 
free telephone lines, special sections 
in the websites of the administrative 
structures, etc.)
All administrative 
structures  with 
control and 
regulatory functions
06/30/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 (types 
of channels for 
receiving information 
established, number 
of hotlines, etc. 
established; number 
of institutions with 
such practices), 7
3.5. Introducing internal mechanisms of control 
of the declarations to avoid conflicts of 
interests of public officials
All administrative 
structures
04/30/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6(share 
of officials who 
have not submitted 
declarations), 7
3.6. Making public the measures for 
transparent governance
All administrative 
structures
03/31/2006 2, 3, 4, 6 (share of 
audience reached), 
7
3.7. Developing a portal website for posting 
draft laws and strategies and giving 
citizens the opportunity to provide input
CM 09/30/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7
3.8. Developing an integrated portal site for 
posting information on the Structural 
Funds and the Cohesion Fund
CM, MF 12/20/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7
3.9. Developing rules and regulations for the 
protection of those reporting instances of 
corruption
Ministry of State 
Administration and 
Administrative Reform 
(MSAAR), Ministry 
of Labor and Social 
Policy (MLSP), 
Ministry of Justice 
(MJ)
12/20/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 
6 (number 
of regulatory 
documents 
developed), 7
3.10. Assessment of the corruption risk at all 
levels of the administrative structures
All administrative 
structures
11/30/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 
(number of analyses 
and proposals), 7
3.11. Updating the job descriptions of all 
managerial positions including detailed 
description of their planning, management, 
and resource control responsibilities, as 
well as  for ensuring compliance with the 
administrative procedures
The managers of 
all administrative 
structures
06/30/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 
(number/share 
of updated job 
descriptions), 7 
3.12. Development and implementation of 
a training program on the problems of 
corruption and conflicts of interests for 
local administration officials
Municipality Mayors 06/30/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 
(number and share 
of officials trained), 
7
3.13. Creating mobility opportunities for public 
officials with special attention to those 
working in units of higher corruption risk 
(public procurement, human resources, 
working with clients, licensing and 
authorization issuing)
MSAAR 07/31/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 
(share of the 
respective officials), 
7
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№ Measure Institution 
responsible
Deadline Indicators
3.14. Introducing criteria for assessment of the 
adherence to the rules of professional 
ethics to be applied in officials’ annual 
performance evaluation
MSAAR 10/31/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 
6 (number of 
evaluation criteria 
adopted), 7
3.15. Including provisions in the Code of Ethics 
of the Holders of High Government 
Office and the Code of Ethics of State 
Administration Officials restricting the 
transfer from the public to the private 
sector in cases when the person has dealt 
with information that might be used to 
the detriment of public interests or was 
directly involved in decision-making to the 
benefit of the private company
MSAAR, CPCC 10/31/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 7
3.16. Conducting loyalty tests, proactive checks, 
and other modern good practices in 
the Ministry of Interior (MI) structures 
exposed to corruption risk
MI ongoing 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 
(number/share of 
officials tested; 
number of checks 
conducted), 7
3.17. Introducing criteria for assessing the 
anticorruption attitude of MI job 
applicants
MI 04/30/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7
3.18. Analysis of the system of additional 
incentives and evaluation of control 
authorities with a view to ensuring their 
independence and objectivity
CPCC,MF, MLSP 03/31/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 
(number of analyses, 
evaluations), 7
3.19. Posting detailed information on the 
activity of the Permanent Committee 
on Protection of the Population in the 
Event of Natural Disasters, Hazards, and 
Accidents on the government website, as 
well as information about spending from 
the national budget
Ministry of 
Government Policy 
on Natural Disasters 
and Accidents 
(MGPNDA)
ongoing 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7
3.20. Providing Internet access to information 
about requests filed under the Law on 
Access to Public Information and the 
respective approvals/denials
MSAAR jointly 
with State Agency 
on Information 
Technology and 
Communication 
(SAITC)
12/20/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7
3.21. Establishing an internal unit for fraud 
prevention and counteraction of 
corruption with the State Agriculture 
Fund in order to expose violations, fight 
corruption, and improve the mechanisms 
guaranteeing transparent, effective and 
appropriate spending of the funds
Ministry of 
Agriculture and 
Forests (MAF), State 
Agriculture Fund
12/20/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7
20 MONITORING OF ANTICORRUPTION REFORMS IN BULGARIA
№ Measure Institution 
responsible
Deadline Indicators
3.22. Building up an information system for 
data entry concerning forthcoming or past 
wood and forestry concession procedures 
in order to guarantee transparency and 
foster public trust in the institution
MAF, National Forest 
Directorate
02/28/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7
3.23. Establishing independent internal audit 
units in public sector organizations
MF Within the 
timeframe 
provided for 
by the Law on 
Internal Audit
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 
6 (number of 
organizations where 
such units have 
been set up; share 
of organizations 
lacking such units), 7
3.24. Development of an Intranet system for 
registration of administrative service 
requests, filing of complaints, reports, and 
proposals, requests for access to public 
information, etc. at all structures of the 
Ministry of the Environment and Waters 
(MEW): Regional Inspection Services on 
the Environment and Waters, Executive 
Environmental Agency,  Water Basins 
Directorates, National Nature Parks
MEW, secondary 
level government 
bodies managing of 
budgetary resources
12/20/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 
(number/share of 
structures with 
Intranet), 7
3.25. Improving the adopted National 
Automated Information System for Road 
Fee Collection in the national road 
network with a view to overcoming the 
influence of the subjective factor
Ministry of Regional 
Development and 
Public Works 
(MRDPW), National 
Road Infrastructure 
Fund
12/20/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7
3.26. Assessment and implementation of 
measures for strict accountability 
and transparency in the process of 
modernization of the armed forces, 
in compliance with the Plan for 
Organizational Development and 
Modernization of the Armed Forces for 
the Period up to 2015
Ministry of Defense 
(MD)
04/30/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 
6 (number of 
measures developed 
and implemented), 
7
3.27. Analysis of the functioning of the Armed 
Forces Development Management System 
and adopting measures to improve it 
with a view to reinforcing clear-cut and 
effective spending and accountability rules 
while observing the requirements for the 
protection of classified information
MD 05/31/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7
3.28. Analysis of the accountability and 
adoption of measures to improve 
counteraction of possible corrupt practices 
in the process of restructuring and 
decommissioning of military establishments 
and facilities of the Bulgarian Army.
MD 06/30/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 
6 (number of 
measures developed 
and implemented), 
7
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№ Measure Institution 
responsible
Deadline Indicators
3.29. Analysis and assessment of the practice 
in real property management and the 
sale of movable assets and development 
and implementation of measures aimed 
to achieve greater transparency and 
competition in such transactions
MD 07/31/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 
6 (number of 
measures developed 
and implemented), 
7
3.30. Assessing the measures for prevention and 
counteraction of possible corrupt practices 
in the operation of sole proprietorships 
with a public stake in the capital where 
the Minister of Defense represents the 
state and updating them with a view to 
the changing economic environment
МD 08/31/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 
6 (number of 
measures updated), 
7
3.31. Improving and updating the system for 
informing the senior management of the 
Ministry of Defense and the Bulgarian 
Army about instances of corruption and the 
development of risk factors conducive to 
corrupt practices
МD 11/30/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7
3.32. Assessment and implementation of the 
mechanism for property declaration and 
accountability of high-ranking army officers
МD 07/31/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 
(number/share of high-
ranking officers who 
have not submitted 
property declarations), 7
3.33. Adopting a plan for the activity and 
interaction between the Military Police 
and Military Counterintelligence Service, 
the MD Inspectorate, and the Financial 
Control Directorate in the period 2006-
2008 as related to the prevention and 
counteraction of corruption
МD 06/30/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7
4. Transparent and Effective Management of the Healthcare System
№ Measure Institution 
responsible
Deadline Indicators
4.1. Improving the effectiveness of the financial 
and medical control implemented in 
medical establishments and registering arising 
conflicts of interests in the activity of public 
employees
Ministry of 
Healthcare (MH)
02/28/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 
6 (number of 
registered cases 
of conflicts of 
interests), 7
4.2. Introducing criteria guaranteeing maximum 
impartiality in the implementation of the 
medical supervision of healthcare quality 
and access to medical services as related to 
mandatory and optional health insurance
МH 02/28/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7
4.3. Ensuring spending transparency and 
accountability in the healthcare system
МH 03/31/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 
6 (number of 
publications, media), 7
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№ Measure Institution 
responsible
Deadline Indicators
4.4. Creating and maintaining a system of 
accountability, monitoring, and control of 
health-insurance contributions
MH, National Health 
Insurance Fund 
(NHIF)
03/31/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7
4.5. Introducing a system of assessment of the 
corruption risk in the structures related to 
public health – NHIF, MH, in the major 
public hospitals
МH 04/30/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 
(number/share of 
institutions where 
such a system is 
in place), 7
4.6. Adopting tougher sanctions for violations of 
professional ethics in the Law on Professional 
Organizations of Physicians and Dentists
МH 04/30/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7
4.7. Introducing one-stop administration service 
systems
MH, NHIF, Regional 
Health Insurance 
Funds, all structures 
with the minister of 
healthcare
06/30/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 
6 (number 
of programs 
implemented; 
number of 
administrations 
with one-stop 
service systems; 
number of services 
provided in such 
manner), 7
4.8. Developing a system of intra-agency control 
concerning the administration of authorization 
and registration regimes
МH 06/30/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 
6 (number of 
organizations having 
introduced the 
system of control), 7
4.9. Adopting a system of evaluation of the 
directors of the national centers for public 
health protection and control, the regional 
healthcare centers, and regional inspection 
services on public health protection and 
control and including an evaluation of 
professional ethics
МH 08/31/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 
6 (number of 
organizations 
having introduced 
the system of 
evaluation), 7
4.10. Development by NHIF of a financial plan 
for the allocation of funds which sets the 
parameters of the activities provided for by 
financed health-insurance, as well as the 
mechanisms for their distribution
MH, NHIF 12/20/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7
4.11. Improving the mechanisms for determining 
the value and volume of  the services 
provided for by health-insurance with a view 
to creating fair competition among medical 
care providers and for quality
MH, NHIF 06/30/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7
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5. Transparent and Effective Management of the Education System
№ Measure Institution 
responsible
Deadline Indicators
5.1. Adopting a system of assessment of the 
corruption risk at all levels in the Ministry 
of Science and Education (MSE) and its 
subordinate structures. Identifying the structures 
and activities with higher corruption risk and 
applying appropriate mechanisms to bring it 
down.
МSE 04/30/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 
6 (number 
of structures 
assessed in 
terms of 
corruption 
risk), 7
5.2. Adopting measures to prevent unlawful 
influence and intervention with teachers’ 
selection when drawing up the requests for 
free textbooks and study aids
МSE 04/30/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 
6 (number 
of measures 
adopted; 
number of 
establishments 
where such 
measures have 
been adopted), 
7
5.3. Expanding the elective education program on  
Anticorruption to cover all secondary schools 
by the 2006/2007 school year
МSE 09/30/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 
6 (number of 
establishments 
offering this 
elective 
subject; 
number of 
students 
covered by the 
training), 7
5.4. Developing and printing free Anticorruption 
textbooks and study aids for the secondary 
schools in the country for the 2006/2007 
school year
MSE, CPCC 09/30/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 
6 (number 
of textbooks 
and study aids 
developed and 
printed), 7
5.5. Developing and publicizing specific programs to 
counter corruption by the academic councils of 
higher education establishments
MSE, university 
rectors, CPCC
07/31/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 
6 (number 
of programs 
developed 
and made 
public; number 
of higher 
education 
establishments 
covered), 7
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6. Provision of Quality Public and Administrative Services
№ Measure Institution 
responsible
Deadline Indicators
6.1. Structuring and establishing a database for 
exchange of public information among public 
administration front offices
MSAAR, CPCC 10/31/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 
6 (number of 
institutions and 
organizations 
having such 
databases in 
place), 7
6.2. Further introduction of e-government, 
including by providing the necessary technical 
equipment and facilities, and Internet access
MSAAR 04/30/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 
6 (quantity of 
newly purchased 
equipment by 
type, number 
of technically 
equipped 
organizations, 
number of 
workplaces with 
Internet access 
by organization), 
7
6.3. Assessment of the implementation progress of 
the Program for Improving Service Delivery in 
State Administration with regard to the one-
stop service system
MSAAR jointly with 
the Ombudsman 
of the Republic of 
Bulgaria
05/31/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 
6 (number of 
structures and 
organizations 
assessed),7
6.4. Developing a catalogue for investors including 
information about the requirements for all 
administrative services provided by the bodies 
within the system of MEW
MEW 11/30/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7
7. Independent Control Institutions Engaged in Efforts to Curb Political and Administrative Corruption
№ Measure Institution 
responsible
Deadline Indicators
7.1. Improving the mechanisms for applying the 
Rules for the Implementation of the Law on 
Measures Against Money-Laundering
MF, Financial 
Intelligence  Agency 
(FIA), Bulgarian 
National Bank 
(BNB), NAO, 
Financial Supervision 
Commission (FSC)
06/30/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7
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№ Measure Institution 
responsible
Deadline Indicators
7.2. Improving the interaction between FIA and 
the other financial-and-regulatory and control 
authorities through exchange of information 
about risk groups of clients, operations and 
transactions, through joint training programs and 
joint inspections of financial institutions, and by 
developing methodologies and instructions for 
such inspections
MF, FSC, BNB 04/30/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 
6 (number 
of conducted 
joint trainings, 
number 
of jointly 
conducted 
examinations), 
7
7.3. Creating a coordination-and-consultancy group 
with the financial-and-regulatory and control 
authorities (BNB, FSC, FIA, and the State 
Commission on Gambling), which is to review 
and propose measures to make the financial 
system less vulnerable to dirty money, including 
of corruption-related origin
MF, FSC, BNB 04/30/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7
7.4. Introducing internal administrative procedures 
for assisting, and taking into consideration the 
recommendations of the national Ombudsman
All central and 
local government 
authorities and their 
administrations, in 
coordination with 
the Ombudsman 
of the Republic of 
Bulgaria
09/30/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 
6 (number 
of structures 
with such 
procedures in 
place), 7
7.5. Creating a mechanism for interaction between 
the national ombudsman and the local public 
mediators in the sphere of prevention and 
counteraction of corruption
The Ombudsman 
of the Republic 
of Bulgaria jointly 
with  the National 
Association of 
Municipalities in 
the Republic of 
Bulgaria and local 
government
07/31/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 
6 (number 
of structures 
covered by this 
mechanism), 7
8. Effectiveness of Anticorruption Penal Policy
№ Measure Institution 
responsible
Deadline Indicators
8.1. Development and implementation of 
mandatory professional ethics training for 
all magistrates and administration officials 
in the judiciary
MJ in coordination 
with the Supreme 
Judicial Council (SJC), 
the Anticorruption 
Commission with 
the SJC, and the 
National Institute of 
Justice
07/31/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 
6 (number of 
programs developed 
and implemented; 
number of 
magistrates and 
administrative 
officials trained), 7
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№ Measure Institution 
responsible
Deadline Indicators
8.2. Introducing modern technologies in the 
judiciary, installing computer systems 
and network equipment in the courts 
to ensure the establishment of national 
information systems
MJ jointly with SJC 12/20/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 
(number of courts 
using modern 
technologies; 
number of courts 
with installed 
computer systems 
and network 
equipment), 7
8.3. Introducing the software for automated 
court case management, for document 
management, for issuing criminal 
conviction certificates, and integrated 
registry system
MJ jointly with SJC 12/20/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 
(number of courts 
to have installed 
software programs; 
number of courts 
to have adopted 
the integrated 
registry system), 7
8.4. Elaborating methods to prove acts of 
corruption in typical cases at MI
МI 05/31/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 
6 (number of 
methodologies 
developed), 7
8.5. Carrying out a feasibility study on 
introducing the obligation for certified 
public accountants to report to the 
institutions concerned any suspected cases 
of bribery by the audited companies
Ministry of Economy 
and Energy (MEE), 
MF jointly with the 
Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants in 
Bulgaria
10/30/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7
8.6. Unification and regular updating of 
statistical information about the initiation 
and course of corruption-related criminal 
cases based on an integrated system of 
indicators
MJ, MI jointly with 
SJC
12/20/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7
8.7. Introducing the core of the integrated 
anti-crime information system at MJ and 
some components of the system at MD, 
the National Investigation Service (NIS), 
as well as the regional units of the Chief 
Directorate on Execution of Penalties with 
MJ
MJ, MD, NIS 12/20/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 
6 (number of 
structures where 
the integrated 
information system 
has been adopted), 
7
8.8. Developing and implementing training 
programs for magistrates on the 
application of the provisions of the Law 
on Administrative Violations and Penalties 
concerning the criminal liability of legal 
entities and for enforcing the legal 
provisions on the confiscation of property 
acquired as a result of criminal activity
MJ jointly with 
SJC, Anticorruption 
Commission with 
the SJC, National 
Institute of Justice, 
Commission for 
Establishing Property 
Acquired from 
Criminal Activity
07/31/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 
(number of training 
programs developed 
and implemented; 
number of 
magistrates trained), 
7
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№ Measure Institution 
responsible
Deadline Indicators
8.9. Analysis of the enforcement of the 
provisions under the Bribery Section and 
other provisions on corruption-related 
crimes in the Penal Code, including the 
effectiveness of the penalties imposed, 
and of the provisions on the confiscation 
of property acquired as a result of 
criminal activity
МJ 12/20/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7
8.10. Analysis of the conformity of domestic 
legislation with the provisions of the UN 
Convention Against Corruption (signed 
by the Republic of Bulgaria in Merida, 
Mexico on December 14, 2003) and 
taking steps to prepare its ratification
МJ 06/30/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7
8.11. Regular working meetings and exchange 
of information between CPCC, the 
Anticorruption Commission with the SJC, 
and the Parliamentary Anticorruption 
Committee in order to improve the 
dialogue between the legislature and 
the judiciary on the enforcement of the 
anticorruption penal policy
CPCC, Anticorruption 
Commission with 
the SJC and 
Parliamentary 
Anticorruption 
Committee
ongoing 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 
(number of working 
meetings held over 
a definite period of 
time), 7
ІІ. Measures in the Economic Sphere
1. Transparent Public Finance Governance
1.1. Transparency and Prevention of Corruption in the Administration of Tax and Customs Revenues
№ Measure Institution 
responsible
Deadline Indicators
1.1.1. Enhancing the mechanisms for the 
monitoring of high-risk goods; conducting 
a policy of active cross border cooperation 
on matters related to the fight against 
trafficking in goods and narcotics
MF, CA 12/20/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7
1.1.2. Expanding the scope and effectiveness of 
the performance of post-control units with 
the Customs Agency (CA)
MF, CA 12/20/2006 2, 3, 4, 7
1.1.3. Expanding the interaction of the Customs 
Agency with other control bodies of the 
executive and bodies of the judiciary, 
with NGOs, the media, professional and 
business associations, and representatives 
of the trade sector
MF, CA 12/20/2006 1, 2, 3, 5, 7
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№ Measure Institution 
responsible
Deadline Indicators
1.1.4. Updating the Guidebook for the Exercise 
of Control in Public Procurement by the 
bodies of PIFCA
PIFCA 06/30/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7
1.1.5. Completing work on the development and 
implementation of the VIES information 
exchange system and making sure the 
Intrastat system is fully operational as of 
the date of accession
National Revenue 
Agency (NRA)
12/20/2006 2, 3, 4, 5, 7
1.1.6. Proposing an amendment to the Penal 
Code with a view to imposing penal 
liability for crimes involving VAT-related 
fraud
MF, MJ 03/31/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7
1.1.7. Drafting a new Law on Value-Added Tax, 
including the adoption of a hypothesis 
wherein VAT reimbursement would be 
subject to provision of adequate collateral, 
which would be valid over a certain 
period of time and would guarantee the 
collection of state dues should the state 
decide to exercise its right to implement 
control within this timeframe, as well as 
introducing solidary liability for persons 
who were or should have been aware that 
they were part of a chain for syphoning 
off VAT.
MF 03/31/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7
1.1.8. Setting up coordination groups between 
the bodies of NPA, the Prosecutor’s Office 
and the Ministry of Interior (MI) for joint 
action in the fight against VAT fraud and 
evasion
NRA, MI jointly 
with the Supreme 
Prosecution Office of 
Cassation (SPOC)
02/28/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 
6 (number of 
groups, number of 
cases exposed), 7
1.1.9. Introducing automated implementation 
of annual risk assessment of all tax-liable 
persons and distributing them in risk 
bands; planning the number of audits in 
accordance with the risk-band distribution 
and monitoring the criteria used by NRA 
for ongoing selection
NRA 12/20/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7
1.1.10. Analysis of the control performed with 
a view to optimizing the processes of 
risk assessment, selection of the persons 
subject to auditing and the implementation 
of control activities
NRA 03/31/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7
1.1.11. Setting up an information data base on 
potential and proven fraud perpetrators 
with a view to speedy, effective, and 
preventive control
NRA 02/28/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7
1.1.12. Developing internal procedures facilitating 
the exposure of corrupt practices in 
the administration of tax revenues and 
insurance contributions
MF, NRA 04/30/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7
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№ Measure Institution 
responsible
Deadline Indicators
1.1.13. Adopting legal and administrative measures 
to fight illegal employment and reduce the 
share of the grey economy
MLSP 12/20/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7
1.2. Public Procurement and Concessions
№ Measure Institution 
responsible
Deadline Indicators
1.2.1. Developing internal rules for improving 
the organization and transparency, and 
alleviating the bureaucratic procedures in 
the area of concessions. Increased control 
over the implementation of concession 
contracts.
All administrations 
with functions related 
to the granting of 
concessions
06/30/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7
1.2.2. Developing a special training module on 
control related to public procurement by 
the bodies of PIFCA
PIFCA 06/30/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7
1.2.3. Analysis of the existing legislation and 
procedures for holding tenders for road 
construction and refurbishment, including 
concession procedures
Ministry of Regional 
Development and 
Public Works 
(MRDPB)
04/30/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7
1.2.4. Maintaining a public procurement registry 
in line with the standards of accountability, 
transparency, free and fair competition in 
the area of public procurement
Public Procurement 
Agency (PPA)
06/30/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7
1.2.5. Improving the system of appeals against 
public procurement procedures in line with 
EU practices
PPA 06/30/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7
1.2.6. Developing and implementing specific 
measures for cooperation with control 
authorities for the purpose of enhancing 
public procurement effectiveness, as well 
as the cooperation between PPA, court 
authorities, and business organizations in 
identifying corruption preconditions and  
developing anticorruption measures in the 
area of public procurement
PPA, all bodies of the 
executive with powers 
under the Law on 
Public Procurement
12/20/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7
1.2.7. Developing a program specifying the sites 
subject to concession and forthcoming 
concession procedures conducted by the 
Ministry of Transport (MT) over the period 
specified
МТ 04/30/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7
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№ Measure Institution 
responsible
Deadline Indicators
1.2.8. Improving the organization of the system of 
intra-agency control of the activity of the 
district road directorates with the Executive 
Road Agency in holding tenders for road 
construction and refurbishment, as well as 
exercising control over the implementation 
and reporting of the activity related to 
construction, ongoing repairs, and winter 
maintenance of roads
MRDPB, Executive 
Agency on Roads
12/20/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7
1.3. Transparency in state-business relations: regulating the forms of public-private partnership
№ Measure Institution 
responsible
Deadline Indicators
1.3.1. Gradual transition from a license and 
authorization regime for business to 
a registration and declaration regime.  
Assigning specific licensing-related activities 
to professional/business organizations, 
with state institutions focusing on control, 
including on declines to issue authorizations 
and licenses
Bodies of the 
executive entrusted 
with powers of 
administering 
regulatory regimes
10/31/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 
6 (number of 
abolished/changed 
regimes), 7
1.3.2. Developing the administrative registry in its 
section on regulatory regimes to guarantee 
transparency
Ministry of State 
Administration and 
Administrative Reform 
(MSAAR), Ministry of 
Economy and Energy 
(MEE), bodies of the 
executive entrusted 
with powers in 
administering 
regulatory regimes
06/30/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7
2. Reinforcing Transparency Mechanisms in the Private Sector: 
Business Associations and Corporate Governance
№ Measure Institution 
responsible
Deadline Indicators
2.1. Developing proposals and model rules for 
reinforcing the transparency and accountability 
in the work of public officials by regulating 
the interaction between the public and 
private sectors
MSAAR 06/30/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7
2.2. Analysis of the existing regulatory framework 
and proposals for amendments with a 
view to creating conditions for broader 
implementation of public-private partnership
MSAAR 12/20/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7
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№ Measure Institution 
responsible
Deadline Indicators
2.3. Reviewing the implementation of the Law 
on Alleviating Administrative Regulation and 
Administrative Control over Economic Activity
MЕE 12/20/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7
2.4. Training administration officials in analysis and 
impact assessment when implementing license 
and registration regimes
Council of 
Ministers (CM), 
MF, MЕE
12/20/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 
(number of officials 
trained), 7
2.5. Assisting the central and local administrations 
in preparing the economic analysis and 
impact assessment when implementing and 
enforcing regulatory acts, including public 
discussion
МEЕ 12/20/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7
ІІІ. Civic Control and Enhanced Cooperation with Civil Society
1. Institutionalization of civic control over the work of the administration, 
the development and implementation of a policy of transparency
№ Measure Institution 
responsible
Deadline Indicators
1.1. Developing and improving the forms of 
anticorruption cooperation between the 
municipalities, state authorities, the media, and 
non-governmental organizations 
MSAAR, MJ, 
CPCC, district 
and municipal 
administrations
09/30/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7
2. Citizen Participation in Preventive Anticorruption Activity
№ Measure Institution 
responsible
Deadline Indicators
2.1. Organizing and holding an anticorruption week CM, CPCC 12/20/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 7
2.2. Conducting an anticorruption awareness raising 
campaign on television and radio, ensuring 
the involvement of the mass media and 
NGOs. Development and dissemination of 
anticorruption visuals.
CPCC 06/30/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 
6 (number of 
programs, number 
of times broadcast, 
size of the 
audience), 7
2.3. Organizing regular quarterly public discussions 
and round tables with the participation of 
NGOs and the local business community on 
the possibilities for civic control over municipal 
budget formation and spending and citizen 
participation in the review of complaints, 
requests, reports, and recommendations 
addressed to the local government authorities
MSAAR, CPCC, 
district and 
municipal 
administrations
Quarterly 1, 2, 3, 4, 7
2.4. Developing standards for the administrative 
services provided
MSAAR  jointly 
with NGOs
12/20/06 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7
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№ Measure Institution 
responsible
Deadline Indicators
2.5. Assessment of the quality of administrative 
service delivery based on indicators
MSAAR jointly 
with NGOs
12/20/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7
3. Assessment of the Spread of Corruption and the Effectiveness of Anticorruption Policies
№ Measure Institution 
responsible
Deadline Indicators
3.1. Developing a system of indicators for the 
implementation of the strategy
CPCC jointly with 
NGOs
04/30/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7
3.2. Assessment of the spread of corruption in the 
country
CPCC jointly with 
NGOs
annually 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 
6 (number of 
surveys), 7
3.3. Biannual public progress reports and updating 
of the Implementation Program for the 2006 
Strategy for Transparent Governance and 
Prevention and Counteraction of Corruption
CPCC jointly with 
NGOs
06/30/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7
3.4. Biannual assessment of the implementation 
progress of the Implementation Program for 
the 2006 Strategy for Transparent Governance 
and Prevention and Counteraction of 
Corruption
CPCC jointly with 
NGOs
06/30/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7
4. Cooperation between State Authorities and Civic Organizations 
in the Adoption of the Best International Practices
№ Measure Institution 
responsible
Deadline Indicators
4.1. Ensuring active participation in GRECO 
activities and in the OECD working group on 
bribes in international transactions
MJ ongoing 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7
4.2. Studying and implementing the positive 
experience of EU countries
All administrative 
structures
ongoing 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7
4.3. Implementing measures to expand 
anticorruption cooperation on national as well 
as international level
CPCC 06/30/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 
6 (number 
of measures 
implemented), 7
4.4. Involving NGO representatives in developing 
a mandatory anticorruption training system for 
the officials at the inspectorates as well as 
on-site familiarization with the international/
European experience and practices in the 
counteraction of corruption
CPCC, MSAAR, MJ 
jointly with NGOs
03/31/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 
6 (number of 
participating 
NGOs), 7
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№ Measure Institution 
responsible
Deadline Indicators
4.5. Setting up public councils for the counteraction 
of corruption with all district administrations. 
Developing and adopting anticorruption 
programs and plans
MSAAR, District 
Governors
06/30/2006 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 
6 (number of 
councils, number 
of programs and 
plans developed), 
7
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Prevention and counteraction of corruption in the high ranks of 
state power
• Number of developed training programs on the problems of corruption, 
conflicts of interest, and professional ethics;
• Number of senior state officials (ministers, deputy ministers, political 
party leaders and advisors, district governors, deputy district governors, 
agency chairpersons and directors, members of commissions, municipal 
mayors) who have completed anticorruption training;
• Number of state officials who have filed property declarations;
• Number of inquiries on allegations of corruption concerning high-
ranking officials;
• Number of exposed conflicts of interests in the high ranks of state power;
• Number of detected violations of the codes of ethics;
• Number of reports of corruption filed;
• Number of sanctioned officials for involvement in corrupt practices (by 
government body; by type of violation and by type of sanction).
Transparent party financing
• Number of parties which have provided information about their sources 
and amounts of financing to the official government authorities;
• Number of parties which have made their financial reports public;
• Number of parties sanctioned for failure to provide financial reports;
• Number of citizens familiar with the system of state subsidy and party 
financing of political parties.
Measures in central and local administration
• Number of district administrations with established public anticorruption 
councils or with adopted anticorruption programs and plans;
• Number of administrations that have introduced one-stop service 
delivery systems and number of services provided in this manner;
• Number of officials who have completed special anticorruption training;
• Number of detected violations of codes of ethics and number of 
persons sanctioned (by administration);
• Number of administrative structures with introduced integrated 
information technologies – e.g., databases for exchange of information, 
technical facilities (PC and Internet access) for each workplace;
• Number of inquiries on allegations of corruption involving central and 
local administration officials;
• Number of exposed conflicts of interests in the administration;
• Number of reports of corruption by manner submitted;
• Number of sanctioned officials for involvement in corrupt practices 
(by government body; by type of violation and by type of sanction)
APPENDIX 3. SPECIFIC INDICATORS FOR PARTICULAR
 OBJECTIVES OF THE STRATEGY
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Transparent and effective management of the healthcare system
• Share of the citizens who have interacted with representatives of the 
healthcare system and who, in the past year, have been asked for 
favors, money, or gifts in order to have a problem of theirs solved;
• Share of the citizens who have interacted with representatives of the 
healthcare system and who, in the past three months, have been 
asked for favors, money, or gifts in order to have a problem of theirs 
solved;
• Share of the citizens who have interacted with healthcare employees 
and to whom it was indicated that they were expected to provide 
money, gifts, or favors;
• Ways in which healthcare employees exert corruption pressure on 
citizens; 
• Main reasons for which citizens typically initiate corrupt practices in 
the sphere of healthcare;
• Share of those who in the past year/three months have had to 
provide money, gifts, or favors to a healthcare employee;
• Number of filed reports of corruption in the healthcare system;
• Number of sanctioned healthcare employees.
Transparent and effective management of the education system
• Share of the citizens who have interacted with representatives of the 
education system and who, in the past year, have been asked for 
favors, money, or gifts in order to have a problem of theirs solved;
• Share of the citizens who have interacted with representatives of the 
education system and who, in the past three months, have been 
asked for favors, money, or gifts in order to have a problem of theirs 
solved;
• Share of the citizens who have interacted with education system 
employees and to whom it was indicated that they were expected to 
provide money, gifts, or favors;
• Ways in which education system employees exert corruption pressure 
on citizens; 
• Main reasons for which citizens typically initiate corrupt practices in 
the sphere of education;
• Share of those who in the past year/three months have had to 
provide money, gifts, or favors to an education system employee;
• Number of education establishments which have introduced 
Anticorruption as an elective subject and number of students 
enrolled;
• Number of filed reports of corruption in the education system;
• Number of sanctioned education system employees.
Transparency and prevention of corruption in the administration of 
tax and customs revenues2
• Share of companies involved in corrupt practices with the tax and 
customs administration;
2 Corruption and Tax Compliance. Policy and Administration Challenges, K. Pashev, Center for the Study 
of Democracy, 2005, p. 102.
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• Share of customs and tax officials involved;
• Frequency and amounts of bribes to the tax and customs 
administration;
• Tax burden, costs of tax evasion, and likelihood of exposure;
• Estimated corruption-related extra income of the occupations in 
customs and tax administration (higher interest in these occupations 
compared to others with similar official remuneration).
Public procurement and concessions
• Share of the particular types of procedures in use for the granting of 
public procurement contracts as provided for by the Law on Public 
Procurement which may generally be defined as open and closed;
• Total amount and share of public procurement contracts where the 
Public Internal Financial Control Agency (PIFCA) found irregularities 
and in particular, those unjustifiably granted without initiating the 
procedures envisioned by law (country total and by municipality);
• Total number and dynamics of audit findings of the National Audit 
Office concerning the spending of public funds by central and local 
government authorities;
• Share of total public procurement contracts for which only one 
candidate has bid and won;
• Share of companies that have made informal payments in order to 
win public procurement contracts;
• Total and average amounts of the informal payments by companies 
in order to secure public procurement contracts;
• Share and total amount of concession contracts (e.g. as share of the 
national budget) awarded without tenders.
Transparency of state-business relations: regulating the forms of 
public-private partnership
• Total share (in cash value) of non-financial contributions, joint ventures, 
etc., with state, municipal or other public property/ownership arranged 
in the absence of transparent publicly accessible procedures;
• Number of exposed conflicts of interests in the process of law 
drafting;
• Members of the boards of directors of enterprises where the state 
holds stakes of over 50% who are political party members (heads and 
deputy heads of municipal/regional structures of parties/movements/
alliances, etc.);
• Share of companies that have made informal payments to obtain 
licenses or authorizations;
• Share of companies that have made informal payments in order 
to evade/reduce taxes, customs duties, fines, fees, and other due 
payments to the state;
• Total and average amounts of the informal payments made by 
companies in relation to applications for  licenses or authorizations, 
participation in public procurement or concession tenders, payment 
of taxes, duties, etc.
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Effectiveness of anticorruption penal policy
• Number of draft laws and other regulatory documents related to 
anticorruption / number of adopted laws and other regulations; 
• Number of initiated, completed, suspended or terminated corruption-
related criminal investigations and number of persons accused;
• Number of indictments and number of persons indicted;
• Number of initiated, completed, suspended or terminated corruption-
related court proceedings;
• Number of convictions and acquittals, types and severity of the 
penalties imposed and number of persons convicted;
• Number of corruption-related complaints filed/number of inquiries 
conducted/number of officials sanctioned for involvement in corrupt 
practices (by government body).
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The corruption indexes summarize the main indicators of the Corruption 
Monitoring System (CMS) of Coalition 2000. Each index sums up several
research questions and allows comparative analysis over time. Corruption 
indexes assume values ranging from 0 to 10. The closer the index value 
is to 10, the more negative the assessments of the corruption situation. 
The values close to 0 indicate proximity to the ideal of a corruption 
free society. 
The corruption indexes are based on the system of indicators reflecting 
patterns of corrupt behavior and attitudes to the various forms of 
corruption. The theoretical model of corruption underlying the CMS 
surveys distinguishes between the following aspects and elements of 
corruption:
1. Corruption Victimization
Acts of corruption fall into two main types – giving a bribe and accepting 
a bribe. These occur in two basic situations:
1) When citizens give bribes in order to obtain something they are 
entitled to by law (otherwise known as “greasing the wheel”);
2) When citizens give bribes in order to obtain something they are not 
entitled to by law.
The registered frequency of acts of corruption characterizes its level in 
the country. The wording of the questions to respondents is of essential 
importance. In this respect, the CMS approach includes several elements 
meant to ensure neutrality, objectivity and anonymity:
a) Rather than the term “bribe”, the phrasing employed is “providing 
money, gifts, or favors”;
b) The respondents are not asked to provide information about how 
much they gave and to whom, etc, to “have a problem of theirs 
solved”; instead, the survey simply registers the act of “giving”;
c) In addition to information about giving bribes, respondents are also 
asked about the solicitation of bribes, i.e. how often they come 
under corruption pressure from public officials and employees. The 
Corruption Indexes constituted on this basis are the following:
• Personal involvement. This index reflects the frequency of self-
reported instances of “providing money, gifts, or favors” in order 
to have a particular problem addressed. Essentially, this index 
shows the level of real corruption in this country in a particular 
period of time.
APPENDIX 4. METHODOLOGY OF THE
 CORRUPTION MONITORING
 SYSTEM INDICATORS
CORRUPTION VICTIMIZATION (AVERAGE MONTHLY NUMBER AND 
RELATIVE SHARE OF CORRUPTION TRANSACTIONS CONCLUDED)
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• Corruption pressure. This index reflects the frequency of cases, 
as reported by citizens, when asked to “give money, gifts, or 
favors” in order to have a problem of theirs solved. What the 
index shows is the level of potential corruption in this country 
in a particular period of time.
It should be noted that indicators concerning acts of corruption do not 
reflect assessments, opinions or perceptions but rather, the reported 
incidence of particular types of activities. It is this kind of indicators 
that underlie the methodology of victimization studies that have a long 
tradition and have been used to assess actual crime levels. The emphasis 
is on actual incidence since, for a number of reasons, not all crimes 
are reported and only some of those registered with the police actually 
reach the courts.
DYNAMICS OF CORRUPTION LEVEL INDEXES FOR THE BUSINESS 
SECTOR
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2. Value System and Moral Preconditions
Although they do not directly influence the level of corruption, values 
and norms play an important role in shaping citizens’ behavior. Of the 
numerous indicators in this area, CMS monitors a set of attitudes having 
an impact on corruption:
1) The level of tolerance of various forms of corruption;
2) The level of awareness of the various types of corruption; 
3) Citizens’ inclination to resort to corrupt practices in order to address 
emerging personal problems.
The Corruption Indexes reflecting this aspect include:
• Acceptability in principle. This index accounts for the level of 
tolerance of acts of corruption by MPs and ministry officials. 
• Susceptibility to corruption. The index sums up a series of 
questions exploring citizens’ inclination to resort to corrupt 
practices when dealing with everyday problems. 
Both indexes in this group reflect assessments and opinions. The positive 
shift in their dynamics shows deepening intolerance of corruption in 
general and reinforced moral norms proscribing involvement in acts of 
corruption.
RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF CORRUPTION (%)
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3. Perceived Spread of Corruption
Citizens’ subjective perceptions of the spread of corruption reflect the 
prevailing public perception of institutions with respect to corruption. 
These perceptions do not directly account for the level of corruption 
since they stem from notions and impressions shaped by the ongoing 
public debate, the media coverage of corruption, personal imperessions, 
etc. In more general terms, they reflect citizens’ opinion on whether 
those in power serve their interest or take advantage of public office in 
pursuit of private benefits. This aspect of corruption is covered by two 
indexes:
• Perceived spread of corruption. This index provides mean 
values of respondents’ perceptions of the spread of corruption 
in society and in particular institutions/occupational groups.
• Practical efficiency. The index provides mean values of the 
perceived efficiency of corruption as a problem-solving tool. 
The perceived efficiency is another indicator for the spread 
of corruption: high efficiency makes it feasible to resort to 
corruption and means it is a popular way of solving problems.
LEVEL OF CORRUPTION VICTIMIZATION AND PERCEPTIONS OF THE 
SPREAD OF CORRUPTION
Source: Vitosha Research/CMS.
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MEDIA COVERAGE AND RELATIVE SOCIAL IMPORTANCE OF CORRUPTION
Source: Vitosha Research/CMS.
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4. Corruption-Related Expectations
Expectations related to corruption reflect the degree of public confidence 
that the problem of corruption can be addressed successfully. These 
expectations are the combined product of respondents’ perception of 
the political will demonstrated by the government and of their opinion 
of the magnitude and gravity of the problem of corruption.
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А. Level and Structure
Object of 
Measurement
Indicator
Statistics & MIS
(‘Hard’ Data)
Surveys (‘Soft’ Data)
Reference DataTaxpayers’ Perceptions/
Personal Experiences
Tax Officers’ Perceptions/
Personal Experiences
Level % 
Involvement 
(Businesses)
• % businesses paying bribes 
to tax officers
(on scale of 1–52)
• # businesses paying bribes 
to tax officers
(on scale of 1–5)
# taxpayers
sanctioned3
% 
Involvement 
(Tax 
Officers)
• % tax officers taking bribes
(on scale of 1–5)
• % tax officers taking bribes 
(on scale of 1–5)
# tax officers
sanctioned4
Incidence
of Bribery
• How often a firm like yours 
might offer bribes, gifts and 
other favours to tax officers? 
(on scale of 1–5)
• How often businesses offer 
bribes, gifts and other 
favours to tax officers?
(on scale of 1–5)
Bribe Size • What is the average size of 
bribes paid?
(on scale of 1–55)
• What is the average size of 
bribes paid?
(on scale of 1–56)
Personal
Experience
• How often last year did 
you have to offer some 
consideration to a tax official 
in connection with your 
duties as taxpayer in the 
form of  bribe/gift/favour/
entertainment? (on scale of 
1–5 each)
• How often last year 
were you offered some 
consideration in connection 
with your duties as 
tax officer in the form 
of  bribe/gift/favour/
entertainment?
(on scale of 1–5 each)
• Did your bribe expenses 
change last year (from the 
previous one):
a) in absolute terms;
б) as a share of sales?
– Yes, went up;
– Yes, went down;
– No change on either basis
• Has bribery changed from 
last year in terms of:
a) # businesses paying 
bribes;
б) incidence /size?
– Yes, went up;
– Yes, went down;
– No change on either basis
APPENDIX 5. INDICATORS OF TRANSPARENCY AND 
 PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION IN THE 
 REVENUE ADMINISTRATION
1 Bribes includes cash and/or in-kind consideration, such as gifts, favours, ‘free lunches’, etc.
2 Scale of 1-5 approximates the following cases:
Rate 1 2 3 4 5 DK/NA
How often? Never Rarely Sometimes Often Always
How many? Few <1/2 over 1/2 >1/2 Almost all
3,4 Indicates both corruption level and detection rate, and being ambiguous, has been included for reference only.
5,6 For cross-country comparisons, the scale may be based on minimum wage or the average wage for the tax administration wage, e.g.: < 1/5; <1/2, <1; <3; >3.
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Object of 
Measurement
Indicator
Statistics & MIS
(‘Hard’ Data)
Surveys (‘Soft’ Data)
Reference DataTaxpayers’ Perceptions/
Personal Experiences
Tax Officers’ Perceptions/
Personal Experiences
Structure • What services are most often 
bribes paid for (rank them): 
evasion of non-compliance 
fines, etc. sanctions; speedier 
procedure (including VAT 
refund); undue tax relief 
(exemptions, allowances, tax 
credit); information about 
(action against) competitors?
• What services do tax payers 
most often pay bribes 
for (rank them): evasion 
of non-compliance fines, 
etc. sanctions; speedier 
procedure (including VAT 
refund); undue tax relief 
(exemptions, allowances, tax 
credit); information about 
(action against) competitors?
Horizontal 
& Vertical 
Patterns
Assess the degree of 
penetration of corruption by 
functional area in terms of:
• Employees involved;
• Bribe sizes;
• Frequency of bribes
Assess the degree of 
penetration of corruption by 
administrative level in terms 
of:
• Employees involved  
• Bribe sizes;
• Frequency of bribes
Assess the degree of 
penetration of corruption by 
functional area in terms of:
• Employees involved  
• Bribe sizes;
• Frequency of bribes
Assess the degree of 
penetration of corruption by 
administrative level in terms 
of:
• Employees involved;
• Bribe sizes;
• Frequency of bribes
B. Demand-Side Drivers and Deterrents
Object of 
Measurement
Indicator
Statistics & MIS
(‘Hard’ Data)
Surveys (‘Soft’ Data) Reference Data
Taxpayers’ Perceptions/
Personal Experiences
Tax Officers’ Perceptions/
Personal Experiences
Corruption
Related to 
Tax Fraud, 
etc. Tax 
Offences
Tax Burden Tax Burden
Indicators:
Marginal &
Effective
Tax rates
• What do you think of the 
rates of PIT, CIT, VAT, SS, 
excise duties, property and 
other local taxes? 
– Not a problem
– Some problem
– Severe problem
• How often last year did your 
firm have to pay a bribe 
to evade non-compliance 
sanctions on account of 
flawed regulations or to 
evade taxes? (on scale of 
1–5)
• Which tax is most often 
evaded?
– PIT;
– CIT;
– VAT;
– Excise;
– Property;
– Other
• What do you think of the 
rates of PIT, CIT, VAT, SS, 
excise duties, property and 
other local taxes?
– Not a problem;
– Some problem;
– Severe problem
• Which tax is most often 
evaded?
– PIT;
– CIT;
– VAT;
– Excise;
– Property;
– Other
Compliance 
Gap7
Evasion 
Cost
Schedule
of Penalties
Bribe Sizes
• In your opinion, are 
penalties an effective 
deterrent against tax 
evasion? (on scale of 1, Very 
effective, to 5, Not all; DK/
NA)
• What is the average bribe 
size as a proportion of 
non-compliance amount 
detected?
– Less than one-fifth;
– One-third;
– Half or more, as much as 
asked;
– DK/DN;
– Other
• In your opinion, are 
penalties an effective 
deterrent against tax 
evasion? (on scale of 1, Very 
effective, to 5, Not all; DK/
NA)
• What is the average bribe 
size as a proportion of 
non-compliance amount 
detected?
– Less than one-fifth;
– One-third;
– Half or more, as much as 
asked;
– DK/DN;
– Other
APPENDIX 5 47
7 Маy reflect both excessive tax burden or compliance costs, or taxpayers’ income-maximising behaviour of taxpayers, and being ambiguous, has been included for reference only.
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Object of 
Measurement
Indicator
Statistics & MIS
(‘Hard’ Data)
Surveys (‘Soft’ Data) Reference Data
Taxpayers’ Perceptions/
Personal Experiences
Tax Officers’ Perceptions/
Personal Experiences
Detection
Probability
& Cost
Probability
of 
Successful
Appeal
• Evasion 
Cases 
Detected
• Correction 
Assessments
Size of 
Correction
• Appeals
before the
Administration
• Appeals 
Overruled b 
Administration
• Court 
Appeals
• Appeals
Overruled by
Courts
• In your opinion, what 
percentage of tax-fraud cases 
is detected by tax officers?
• Of those detected, what 
percentage is actually  
punished, i.e. penalties are 
not evaded by bribes?
• In your opinion, which 
companies evade more taxes 
(as a percentage of tax 
liability)?
– Small;
– Large,
– Other;
– DK/NA
• Do you believe that the 
probability of detection 
depends on the size of the 
fraud?
• Have you last year been 
audited or examined for 
non-compliance?
• Have you last year evaded 
non-compliance penalties by 
paying a bribe?
• Have you last year appealed 
any correction assessment?
• If so, was your appeal 
successful?
– Yes;
– No;
– Still pending
• In your opinion, what 
percentage of tax-fraud is 
detected by tax officers?
• Of those detected, what 
percentage is actually  
punished, i.e. penalties are 
not evaded by bribes?
• In your opinion, which 
companies evade more taxes 
(as a percentage of tax 
liability)?
– Small;
– Large,
– Other;
– DK/NA
• Do you believe that the 
probability of detection 
depends on the size of the 
fraud?
Object of 
Measurement
Indicator
Statistics & MIS
(‘Hard’ Data)
Surveys (‘Soft’ Data) Reference Data
Taxpayers’ Perceptions/
Personal Experiences
Tax Officers’ Perceptions/
Personal Experiences
Risk 
Tolerance
• Do you have insurance on 
your home or other real 
estate?
• If you were given a choice 
between evasion and avoidance 
resulting in the same amount 
of tax savings, but in evasion 
you would face a 50:50 
probability of detection and 
penalty, while in avoidance 
you would have to pay the tax
consultant a fee equal to half 
the evasion penalty, which one 
would you choose?
– Evasion;
– Avoidance;
– Neither;
– DK/NA
Service-
related
corruption
(faster 
service
delivery, 
etc. 
compliance
facilities)
• Existing 
service level 
standards
• Compliance 
with 
standards 
monitored & 
reported
• How often last year did your 
firm have to pay a bribe for 
faster service, tax rebates, 
etc.? (on scale of 1–5)
• Has the administration 
adopted service level 
standards?
• What do you think of 
the efficiency of the tax 
administration? (on scale 
of  1, Simple and stable 
regulations, and low 
compliance costs, to 5, 
Inefficient, high compliance 
costs)
• What average proportion of 
work time is spent by: (a) 
the firm’s owner/manager; 
(b) the firm’s accounting 
and other staff on ensuring 
compliance under:
– PITA;
– CITA;
– VATA;
– SS regulations;
– Excise duty regulations:
– PTA:
– Other?
• Has your administration 
adopted service level 
standards?
• If so, is compliance with 
the standards monitored, 
assessed and reported 
publicly?
• How often last year did you 
encounter the following in 
taxpayers? (on scale of 1–5)
– Dissatisfaction with 
service;
– Ignorance of their rights 
and duties;
– Excessive expectations;
– A-bribe-can-buy-anything 
attitude
‘Time tax’ data 
from business
environment
surveys 
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Object of 
Measurement
Indicator
Statistics & MIS
(‘Hard’ Data)
Surveys (‘Soft’ Data) Reference Data
Taxpayers’ Perceptions/
Personal Experiences
Tax Officers’ Perceptions/
Personal Experiences
Institutionali-
sation of 
Corruption 
Bribe 
Effectiveness
Perceived
Corruption
Costs
(Economic 
Cost
of 
Corruption)
• Are there fixed rates of 
irregular payment for tax-
compliance services and are 
they common knowledge in 
your industry?
• How reliable is a bribe? Do 
tax officers deliver on their 
part of the deal?
• Rank the three most likely 
negative effects of corruption
C. Supply-Side Drivers and Opportunities
Object of 
Measurement
Indicator
Statistics & MIS
(‘Hard’ Data)
Surveys (‘Soft’ Data) Reference Data
Taxpayers’ Perceptions/
Personal Experiences
Tax Officers’ Perceptions/
Personal Experiences
HRM 
Effectiveness 
& Fairness
Pay-Bonus & 
Performance-
Appraisal 
System as 
related to 
Career & Pay 
Development, 
Selection & 
Training
Staff Turnover 
Rate
Educational
Levels
Absenteeism
• Assess the fairness and 
effectiveness of the following 
HRM components:
– Compensation;
– Bonuses;
– Performance appraisal;
– Performance appraisal 
impact on career and 
compensation development;
– Recruitment & Selection;
– Training
Deterrents Detection
Probability
Detection 
Cost
Risk 
Tolerance
Moral
Inhibitions
• Corruption 
Complaint 
Inquiries
• Disciplinary 
Actions 
Taken
• Existing Code 
of Ethic
• If you were caught taking 
bribes, what would be the 
most likely punishment?
• If you lost your job, what 
would be your chances of 
employment in the private 
sector?
• Do you have insurance on 
your home or other real 
estate?
• Rank the three most likely 
negative effects of corruption
Object of 
Measurement
Indicator
Statistics & MIS
(‘Hard’ Data)
Surveys (‘Soft’ Data) Reference Data
Taxpayers’ Perceptions/
Personal Experiences
Tax Officers’ Perceptions/
Personal Experiences
Institutional
Environment
• What are your 
administration’s worst 
problems?
• What are the main causes 
of corruption in your 
administration?
• What measures would 
minimise corruption in your 
administration?
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